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Abstract
A graph game is a two-player zero-sum game in which the players move a token throughout a
graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. In bidding
games, in each turn, we hold an “auction” (bidding) to determine which player moves the token.
The players simultaneously submit bids and the higher bidder moves the token. Several different
payment schemes have been considered. In first-price bidding, only the higher bidder pays his
bid, while in all-pay bidding, both players pay their bids. Bidding games were largely studied
with variants of first-price bidding. In this work, we study, for the first time, infinite-duration
all-pay bidding games, and show that they exhibit the elegant mathematical properties of their
first-price counterparts. This is in stark contrast with reachability all-pay bidding games, which
were recently shown to be technically much more complicated than reachability first-price bidding
games. Another orthogonal distinction between the bidding rules is in the recipient of the payments:
in Richman bidding, the bids are paid to the other player, and in poorman bidding, the bids are
paid to the “bank”. We focus on strongly-connected games. We completely solve all-pay Richman
games. We first show that deterministic strategies cannot guarantee anything in this model. The
main technical challenge is showing that with probabilistic strategies and mean-payoff objectives, the
optimal expected payoff under all-pay bidding equals the optimal payoff under first-price bidding.
We also construct almost-sure winning strategies for parity games. Under poorman all-pay bidding,
in contrast to Richman bidding, deterministic strategies are useful and guarantee a payoff that is
only slightly lower than the optimal payoff under first-price poorman bidding. This gives rise to
winning strategies in parity games. Our proofs are constructive. For both Richman and poorman
bidding we revisit the constructions for first-price bidding and significantly simplify them.
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1 Introduction
Graph games are two-player zero-sum games with deep connections to foundations of logic
[25] as well as numerous practical applications, e.g., verification [15], reactive synthesis [23],
and reasoning about multi-agent systems [2]. The game proceeds by placing a token on
one of the vertices and allowing the players to move it throughout the graph to produce an
infinite trace, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players
alternate turns when moving the token. In bidding games [19, 18], however, the players have
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Figure 1 The mean-payoff game Gbowtie
with the weights in the vertices.
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Figure 2 Max’s budget updates in four
bidding outcomes under AP-Rich.
budgets, and in each turn, we hold an “auction” (bidding) to determine which player moves
the token.
Four concrete bidding mechanisms have been previously defined. In all mechanisms, in
each turn, both players simultaneously submit a bid that does not exceed their available
budget, and the higher bidder moves the token. The mechanisms differ in their payment
schemes, which we classify according to two orthogonal properties. First, in first-price bidding
only the higher bidder pays his bid, whereas in all-pay bidding, both players pay their bids.
Second, in Richman bidding (named after David Richman) the payment(s) are paid to the
other player whereas in poorman bidding the payments are paid to the “bank”, thus the
money is lost. We refer to the mechanisms using abbreviations in {FP,AP} × {poor,Rich}.
For example, FP-poor refers to first-price poorman and AP-Rich refers to all-pay Richman.
The central quantity in bidding games is the budget ratio; for i ∈ {1, 2}, when Player i’s
budget is Bi, then his budget ratio is Bi/(B1 +B2).
Reachability FP-Rich and FP-poor games were studied in [19, 18]; each player has a
target vertex, and the game ends once one of the targets is reached. It was shown that each
vertex of the game has a threshold ratio, which is a necessary and sufficient initial budget
for winning the game. Moreover, if a player has a sufficient budget for winning, he has a
deterministic winning strategy. Only under FP-Rich bidding do reachability games have an
intriguing equivalence with a class of games called random-turn games [22], in which in each
turn, we toss a coin to determine which player moves the token (see more details in [18, 4]).
Reachability AP-poor games were only recently studied [7]. Technically, these games are
significantly harder than first-price bidding: e.g., optimal strategies randomize over biddings,
and already in very simple games, infinite support is required. Moreover, fundamental
questions about this model are open.
Infinite-duration bidding games were studied under FP-Rich [4] and FP-poor [5] bidding.
For qualitative objectives, e.g., parity, bidding games reduce to reachability first-price bidding
games by showing that one of the players wins a strongly-connected game with any positive
initial ratio. Things get more interesting with mean-payoff objectives, which are quantitative
(see Fig. 1 for an example): an infinite play has a payoff which is Player 1’s reward and
Player 2’s cost, thus in these games the players are called Max and Min, respectively. The
central question is identifying the optimal payoff Max can guarantee in a mean-payoff game
G with an initial budget ratio r.1
Mean-payoff first-price bidding exhibit intriguing equivalences with random-turn games.
For a bias p ∈ [0, 1], we denote by RT(G, p), the random-turn game in which in each turn,
we toss a coin that selects Max to move with probability p and Min with probability 1− p.
The game RT(G, p) is a mean-payoff stochastic game [13], its mean-payoff value, denoted
MP(RT(G, p)), is a well-known concept [24]. Under FP-Rich bidding, the initial budget
1 Technically, c is optimal when Max can guarantee a payoff that is greater than c− ε, for every ε > 0.
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ratio does not matter, and the optimal payoff Max can guarantee is MP(RT(G, 0.5)). Thus,
similar to reachability FP-Rich games, mean-payoff FP-Rich games are equivalent to fair
random-turn games. Since such an equivalence is not known for reachability FP-poor games,
it is surprising that mean-payoff FP-poor games are equivalent to random-turn games and
the equivalence is in fact richer than for FP-Rich bidding: with an initial ratio of r, the
optimal payoff Max can guarantee under FP-poor bidding is MP(RT(G, r)). Thus, the initial
ratio matters and coincides with the bias of the coin in the random-turn game. For example,
in the game depicted in Fig. 1, with a ratio of r = 0.75, Max prefers FP-poor over FP-Rich,
since with the first he can guarantee a payoff of 0.75 and with the second, only 0.5.
We study, for the first time, infinite-duration all-pay bidding games. The starting point
of this research is inspired by the results for FP-poor bidding: the moral of these results is
that as we “go to the infinity”, bidding games become cleaner and exhibit a more elegant
mathematical structure. We ask: Does this phenomenon also hold for all-pay bidding, where
reachability games are highly complex? Would infinite-duration all-pay bidding games reveal
a clean mathematical structure like their first-price counterparts? We answer both of these
questions positively.
Before surveying our results, we note that in terms of applications, all-pay bidding is
often better suited for modelling practical applications than first-price bidding. Applications
arise from viewing the players’ budgets as resources with little or no inherent value, e.g.,
time or strength, and a strategy as a recipe to invest resources with the goal of maximizing
the expected utility. In many settings, invested resources are lost, thus all-pay bidding
is more appropriate than first-price bidding. Reachability AP-poor games [7] can be seen
as a dynamic variant of Colonel Blotto games [9], which have been extensively studied.
Applications of Colonel Blotto games, which carry over to all-pay bidding games, include
political lobbying and campaigning, rent seeking [27], and modelling biological processes [12].
In fact, due to their dynamic nature, bidding games are a better model for these applications.
Another application of bidding games is reasoning about systems in which the scheduler
accepts payment in exchange for priority. Blockchain technology is one such example.
Simplifying the technology, a blockchain is a log of transactions issued by clients and
maintained by miners, who accept transaction fees from clients in exchange for writing
transactions to the blockchain. In Etherium, the blockchain consists of snippets of code
(called smart contracts). Verification of Etherium programs is both challenging and important
since bugs can cause loss of money (e.g., [11]). Bidding games, and specifically AP-poor games,
can model Etherium programs: we associate players with clients and, as is standard in model
checking, we associate the states of the program with the vertices of the graph. AP-poor
bidding is the most appropriate bidding mechanism since in Etherium, the transaction fees
are always paid to the miners.
We start by studying all-pay Richman biding and showing a complete picture for this
bidding mechanism. We focus on games played on strongly-connected graphs. A simple
argument shows that a deterministic Max strategy cannot guarantee anything under AP-Rich
bidding. We turn to study probabilistic strategies, which is technically more challenging.
We show that mean-payoff AP-Rich games are essentially equivalent to their first-price
counterparts: in a game G, with any positive initial ratio, Max’s optimal probabilistic
strategy guarantees an expected payoff that equals the value of G under FP-Rich, which in
turn equals MP(RT(G, 0.5)); namely, the value of the fair random-turn game.
In parity AP-Rich games, we show that one of the players has a randomized strategy that
guarantees winning with probability 1, and the winner depends only on the highest parity
index in the game. Showing, again, an equivalence between parity AP-Rich and FP-Rich
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games. Our almost-sure winning strategy in a parity AP-Rich game P is obtained by evoking
carefully and repeatedly an optimal strategy in a mean-payoff AP-Rich game G so that even
though the guarantee in G is on the expected payoff, we obtain almost-sure guarantees in P .
Our solution of mean-payoff AP-Rich games is based on a new significantly-simpler
construction of optimal strategies in mean-payoff FP-Rich games. The previous constructions
of optimal FP-Rich strategies [4, 6] use the history of the play to determine the next
bid; namely, the bid is roughly a function of the difference between the number of Max
wins and loses during the play. It is technically not possible to use such a strategy in
AP-Rich, as we illustrate in the example below. We devise new FP-Rich strategies that are
history independent: the bid depends only the current budget and vertex, hence the name
budget-based strategies, which are interesting in their own right.
I Example 1. We describe a simple Max strategy for the mean-payoff game Gbowtie that is
depicted in Fig. 1, which achieves an expected payoff of 0.25 under AP-Rich bidding; still not
optimal, but better than any deterministic strategy can achieve. We start with the following
observation. Suppose Max chooses a bid uniformly random from {0, b}, for some b > 0. We
assume Min wins ties. Thus, knowing Max’s strategy, Min chooses between deterministically
bidding 0 or b. There are four possible outcomes (see Table 2). The “bad” outcomes for Max
are 〈0, 0〉 and 〈b, b〉 since Min wins without any budget penalty. The two other outcomes are
“good” since they are similar to FP-Rich bidding: Max pays b for winning and gains b when
losing. To obtain a probabilistic strategy for AP-Rich, we use an optimal strategy fFP for
FP-Rich as in [4], which achieves a payoff of 0.5 by guaranteeing that Max wins as many
biddings as Min (up to a constant). We input to fFP the difference between Max wins and
losses when restricting to good outcomes to obtain b = fFP(pi). Intuitively, we expect half
the outcomes in a play to be good, out of these, fFP guarantees that Max roughly wins half
the biddings, for a total payoff of 0.25.
The construction above relies on a classification of outcomes to “good” and “bad”. To
obtain an optimal strategy for AP-Rich, we would like decrease to a minimum the probability
mass of the “bad” outcomes by bidding uniformly at random in [0, b]. But then, it is not
clear how to use fFP to obtain b. For example, when Min bids 0, both when Max bids ε > 0
and 2ε, he wins the bidding. However, Max is “luckier” in the first outcome since he pays
less for winning. To overcome this issue, we devise a new optimal budget-based bidding
strategy f ′FP for FP-Rich. Intuitively, the current budget B reflects precisely how “lucky”
Max was in the previous biddings. We construct an optimal strategy under AP-Rich that
bids uniformly at random from [0, f ′FP(B)]. J
Finally, we study mean-payoff all-pay poorman bidding. Poorman bidding games tend
to be unpredictable and technically more challenging than Richman bidding. AP-poor is
no exception. We show that, contrary to AP-Rich, deterministic strategies are useful under
AP-poor bidding. Consider a game G and suppose Max’s ratio is r > 0.5. We show that the
optimal payoff Max can guarantee with a deterministic strategy in G is MP(RT(G, (2r−1)/r)).
Not too far from the optimal payoff under FP-poor, which is MP(RT(G, r)). The result
immediately implies that in a parity AP-poor game, one of the players wins with a ratio
greater than 0.5. Here too, we first revisit mean-payoff FP-poor games and construct optimal
budget-based strategies, which are significantly simpler than previous constructions. We
leave open the problem of finding optimal probabilistic strategies for AP-poor bidding.
Further related work: All the results surveyed above highly depend on the fact that
the players’ bids can be arbitrarily small. This is a problematic assumption for practical
applications. To address this limitation discrete bidding games were studied in [14], where the
budgets are given in “cents” and the minimal positive bid is one cent. Their motivation came
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from recreational play like bidding chess [8, 17]. AP-poor is not suited for discrete bidding
since the budgets run out quickly. Discrete AP-Rich bidding has been studied in [21] (we
encourage the reader to try playing AP-Rich tic-tac-toe online: http://tiny.cc/hqbgoz).
While the issue of tie breaking does not play a key role in continuous bidding, it is important
in discrete bidding [1]. Non-zero-sum FP-Rich games were studied in [20].
2 Preliminaries
A bidding game is a two-player game that is played on a directed graph G = 〈V,E〉, where
V is a finite set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V is a set of directed edges. The neighbors of a
vertex v ∈ V is the set of vertices {u ∈ V : 〈v, u〉 ∈ E}. A path in G is a finite or infinite
sequence of vertices v1, v2, . . . such that for every i ≥ 1, we have 〈vi, vi+1〉 ∈ E. We denote
by cycles(G), the set of simple cycles in G. We call a bidding game strongly-connected when
the graph G is strongly-connected. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we use −i as short for 3− i when referring
to the “other player”.
2.1 Bidding games, strategies, and plays.
The game proceeds as follows. We place a token on one of the vertices in the graph. In each
turn, we hold a bidding to determine which player moves the token. Formally, a strategy
is a recipe for how to play a game. It is a function that, given a finite history of the game,
prescribes to a player a probability distribution over actions to take, where we define these
two notions below. A strategy is deterministic when it always prescribes one action with
probability 1.
Actions in bidding games are pairs of the form 〈b, v〉, where b ∈ R≥0 is a bid and v ∈ V is
the vertex to move the token to upon winning the bidding. Suppose Player i, for i ∈ {1, 2},
bids bi in a bidding. The winner of the bidding is Player 1 if b1 > b2 and otherwise it is
Player 2. That is, we resolve ties in favor of Player 2. This is an arbitrary decision and our
results are not affected by the tie-breaking mechanism that is used. A history in a bidding
game is pi = 〈v1, b1,1, b1,2〉, . . . , 〈vn, bn,1, bn,2〉, vn+1 ∈ (V ×R2≥0)∗ ·V , where for 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1,
the token is placed on vertex vj at round j, and bj,i, denotes Player i’s bid at round j, for
i ∈ {1, 2}. An action 〈b, v〉 is legal following pi if (1) v is a neighbor of vn+1, thus a history
gives rise to a path in the graph, which we denote by path(pi), and (2) the bid b does not
exceed the available budget as we define below.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by Wi(pi), Li(pi) ⊆ {1, . . . , n} the indices in which Player i wins
and loses biddings, respectively. Suppose Player i’s initial budget is BIi ∈ R≥0. The available
budget of Player i following pi, denoted Bi(pi), depends on the bidding mechanism, and we
consider four bidding mechanisms that differ in the payment scheme in each bidding:
First-price Richman: only the winner pays the loser, thus Bi(pi) = BIi +
∑
j∈Li(pi) bj,−i−∑
j∈Wi(pi) bj,i.
First-price poorman: only the winner pays the “bank”, thusBi(pi) = BIi−
∑
j∈Wi(pi) bj,i.
All-pay Richman: both players pay each other, thus Bi(pi) = BIi +
∑
1≤j≤n bj,−i −∑
1≤j≤n bj,i.
All-pay poorman: both players pay the “bank”, thus Bi(pi) = BIi −
∑
1≤j≤n bj,i.
I Definition 2. (Budget-based strategy). A strategy f is called budget-based if it is
independent of the history of the play and it is a function from the current vertex and budget
to a vertex and a probability distribution on bids.
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An initial vertex v0 and two strategies f and g for the players give rise to a probability
distribution over infinite plays, which we denote by dist(f, g), where we omit the initial
vertex since it usually does not play a role in our results. When f and g are deterministic,
there is a unique play that gets probability 1 in dist(f, g), and we denote it by play(f, g).
It is defined inductively as follows. The initial vertex is v0. Let pi be a finite play that
ends in v, we define its continuation pi′ as follows. Let 〈b1, u1〉 = f(pi) and 〈b2, u2〉 = g(pi).
Then, if b1 > b2, we define pi′ = pi, 〈v, b1, b2〉, u1 and otherwise pi′ = pi, 〈v, b1, b2〉, u2. Since
we consider probabilistic strategies with continuous support, the definition requires us to
define a probability space using a cylinder construction [3, Theorem 2.7.2], which is technical
but standard and we do not present it here. When f and g are clear from the context, we
omit them and simply write P and E instead of Pdist(f,g) and expectation Edist(f,g).
2.2 Objectives and values
The central quantity in bidding games is the ratio between the players’ budgets.
I Definition 3. (Budget ratio). For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Bi be Player i’s budget. Then, Player i’s
ratio is Bi/(B1 +B2). In Richman bidding, since the money only exchanges hands, the sum
of budgets is constant and we normalize it to 1. In poorman bidding, we often normalize
Player 2’s budget to 1.
A qualitative objective O is a set of infinite paths. The central question in qualitative
bidding games concerns the necessary and sufficient initial ratio for guaranteeing that an
objective is satisfied. The qualitative objectives that we consider are:
Reachability: Player 1 has a target vertex t and an infinite play is winning iff it visits t.
Parity: Each vertex is labeled with an index in {1, . . . , d}. An infinite path is winning
for Player 1 iff the parity of the maximal index that is visited is odd.
I Definition 4. (Winning strategies). Consider a Player 1 strategy f . We say that f
surely wins if it is deterministic and for every deterministic strategy g, we have play(f, g) ∈ O.
We say that f almost-surely wins if for every strategy g, we have Ppi∼dist(f,g)[pi ∈ O] = 1.
The quantitative objective we focus on is mean-payoff. Each play in a mean-payoff game
has a payoff, which is Player 1’s reward and Player 2’s cost, thus in mean-payoff games,
we refer to Player 1 as Max and to Player 2 as Min. The central question in mean-payoff
bidding games concerns the optimal payoff a player can guarantee with an initial ratio, called
the mean-payoff value. Technically, a mean-payoff game is played on a weighted directed
graph 〈V,E,w〉, where w : V → Q. Consider an infinite path η = v1, v2 · · · ∈ V ω. For n ∈ N,
the prefix of length n of η is ηn = v1, . . . , vn. The energy of ηn is energy(η) =
∑
1≤i<n w(vi).
We define the payoff of an infinite and finite paths. For an infinite path η and n ∈ N, we
define payoff(ηn) = energy(ηn)/(n− 1) and payoff(η) = lim infn→∞ payoff(ηn). Note that the
definition gives Min an advantage. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let ΠDi (r) and ΠPi (r) respectively denote
the set of deterministic and probabilistic strategies for Player i with an initial ratio of r.
I Definition 5. (Mean-payoff value). Consider a mean-payoff game G and a ratio r.
The expected-value of G w.r.t. r, denoted eMP(G, r), is c ∈ R if for every ε > 0 and no
matter where the game starts, Max has a probabilistic strategy f ∈ ΠPMax(r) s.t. for every
g ∈ ΠPMin(1−r), we have lim infn→∞ Epin∈distn(f,g)[payoff(pin)] > c−ε, and dually, there is
g ∈ ΠPMin(1−r) s.t. for every f ∈ ΠPMax(r), we have lim infn→∞ Epin∈distn(f,g)[payoff(pin)] <
c+ ε.
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The sure-value of G w.r.t. r, denoted sMP(G, r), is c ∈ R if Max can deterministically
guarantee a payoff of c: for every ε > 0 and no matter where the game starts, there is
f ∈ ΠDMax(r) s.t. for every g ∈ ΠDMin(1 − r), we have payoff(play(f, g)) > c − ε. And,
Max cannot do better: for every Max strategy f ∈ ΠDMax(r), there is g ∈ ΠDMin(1− r) that
guarantees payoff(play(f, g)) < c+ ε.
We sometimes write MPγ(G, r), for γ ∈ {FP-Rich,AP-Rich,FP-poor,AP-poor} to high-
light the bidding mechanism that is used. We note that in order to show that f guarantees
an expected payoff of c, it suffices to show that it guarantees an expected payoff of c against
every deterministic strategy g.
2.3 Random-turn games, strengths, and potentials
In this section, we describe the tool that, intuitively, allows us to extend a solution for
the game Gbowtie (Fig. 1) to a general strongly-connected game. In such games, we need
a measure of how “important” it is to choose the successor of a vertex, which we call the
strength. The higher the strength of v ∈ V , the higher a player should bid while the token is
in v. To define strengths, we need several definitions.
A random-turn game [22] parameterized by p ∈ [0, 1] is played on a graph as a bidding
game, only that instead of bidding for moving, we throw a (biased) coin to determine which
player moves the token: Player 1 is chosen with probability p and Player 2 with probability
1− p. Formally, a random-turn game is a stochastic game [13]. The objective in RT(G, p)
matches that of G, and we focus on strongly-connected mean-payoff random-turn games. The
mean-payoff value of RT(G, p), denote MP(RT(G, p)), is defined as the expected payoff that
a player can guarantee. It is well-known that it is achievable using positional strategies [24].
Such a strategy takes as input the vertex the token is placed on, and returns which vertex
to move the token to upon being selected by the coin toss. Let σMax and σMin respectively
denote optimal positional strategies for Max and Min. For v ∈ V , we denote v+ = σMax(v)
and v− = σMin(v). The concept of potentials was originally defined in the context of the
strategy iteration algorithm [16]. We denote the potential of a vertex v ∈ V by Potp(v) and
the strength of v by Stp(v), and we define them as solutions to the following equations.
Potp(v) = p · Potp(v+) + (1− p) · Potp(v−) + w(v)−MP(RT(G, p)) and
Stp(v) = p · (1− p) ·
(
Potp(v+)− Potp(v−)
)
There are optimal strategies for which Potp(v−) ≤ Potp(v′) ≤ Potp(v+), for every neighbor
v′ of v, which can be found, for example, using the strategy iteration algorithm. Note that
St(v) ≥ 0, for every v ∈ V . We denote the maximal strength by Smax = maxv∈V Stp(v) and
we assume Smax > 0 otherwise the game is trivial as all weights are equal.
Consider a finite path η = v1, . . . , vn in G. We intuitively think of η as a play, where for
every 1 ≤ i < n, the bid of Max in vi is St(vi) and he moves to v+i upon winning. Thus,
when vi+1 = v+i , we think of Max as investing Stp(vi) and when vi+1 6= v+i , we think of
Min winning the bid thus Max gains Stp(vi). We denote by I+(η) and G+(η) the sum of
investments and gains, respectively. Note that I+(η) and G+(η) are defined w.r.t RT(G, p)
and p will be clear from the context. Recall that the energy of η is energy(η) =
∑
1≤i<n w(vi).
The following lemma connects the energy, potentials, and strengths.
I Lemma 6. [6] Consider a strongly-connected game G, and p ∈ [0, 1]. For every finite path
η = v1, . . . , vn in G, we have Potp(v1) − Potp(vn) + (n − 1) ·MP(RT(G, p)) ≤ energy(η) +
G+(η)/(1− p)− I+(η)/p. In particular, when p = ν/(µ+ ν) for ν, µ > 0, there is a constant
X:8 Infinite-Duration All-Pay Bidding Games
P = minv Potp(v)−maxv Potp(v) such that ν·µν+µ ·
(
energy(η)−P−(n−1) ·MP(RT(G, νµ+ν )) ≥
µ · I+(η)− ν ·G+(η).
The proof of the following corollary can be found in App. A.
I Corollary 7. Consider a strongly-connected game G, let pi be an infinite play, let µ, ν ∈ R>0,
and M ∈ R. If µ · I+(pi)− ν ·G+(pi) ≥M for every finite prefix pin of pi, then payoff(pi) ≥
MP(RT(G, νµ+ν )).
3 All-Pay Richman Bidding Games
In this section we completely solve infinite-duration all-pay Richman bidding games. We
focus on strongly-connected games. We start with the following negative result that shows
that deterministic strategies are useless in all-pay Richman bidding.
I Theorem 8. Let G be a strongly-connected game. For any initial ratio r ∈ (0, 1) and a
deterministic Player 1 strategy, Player 2 has a strategy that wins all but a constant number
of biddings. Specifically,
1. When G is a mean-payoff game, the sure-value of G is the lowest possible; namely,
sMPAP-Rich(G, r) = minη∈cycles(G) MP(η);
2. When G is a parity game that has a cycle in cycles(G) with an even maximal parity index,
then no deterministic Player 1 strategy can guarantee winning with a positive probability.
Proof. Let 2ε > 0 be Player 2’s initial budget. Consider a deterministic Player 1 strategy
that, for j ≥ 1, bids bj,1 in the i-th bidding. Player 2 bids bj,2 = bj,1 + 2−i · ε when bj,2 ≤ B2,
and other he bids 0. Suppose Player 1’s initial budget is BI1 . Since whenever Player 2 loses a
bidding, Player 1 bids at least ε, and the sum of Player 2’s payments to Player 1 in a finite
play is less than ε, Player 1 can win at most dBI1/εe times. J
3.1 Revisiting mean-payoff first-price Richman games
Our construction of optimal probabilistic strategies in mean-payoff AP-Rich games is based on
a new significantly-simpler construction of budget-based strategies for mean-payoff FP-Rich
games. Our constructions throughout the paper use the following definition:
I Definition 9. (Shift function). The shift function λ : (0, 1) → (1,+∞) is defined as
λ(x) = − log(1−x)log(1+x) .
The proof of the following lemma can be found in App. C.
I Lemma 10. The shift function has the following properties:
For every y ∈ (1,+∞), there exists x ∈ (0, 1) such that λ(x) = y.
For every x ∈ (0, 1), we have (1− x) = (1 + x)−λ(x).
Previous constructions of optimal strategies for mean-payoff FP-Rich games can be found
in [4, 6]. Below we revisit mean-payoff FP-Rich games and devise optimal budget-based
strategies. For ease of presentation, we illustrate the construction on the simple game Gbowtie,
and it can easily be extended to general SCCs, as we note in the proof.
I Proposition 11. Consider the game Gbowtie, depicted in Fig. 1. Under first-price Richman
bidding, for every initial ratio r ∈ (0, 1) and ε > 0, Max has a deterministic budget-
based strategy that guarantees a payoff of at least 0.5 − ε, thus sMPFP-Rich(Gbowtie, r) =
MP(RT(Gbowtie, 0.5)) = 0.5.
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Proof. Let BIMax > 0 be Max’s initial budget. It is convenient to set the weights in the
game to −1 and c, where c > 1 depends on ε, and setting Max’s goal to keep the energy
bounded from below by a constant. Then, as the length of the play tends to infinity, the
ratio of Max’s wins tends to 11+c , thus the payoff in the original game is 0.5− ε. Let α such
that α = λ(c) (see Lem. 10). Max maintains the invariant that when the energy is k ∈ N,
his budget exceeds (1 + α)−k. We choose an initial kI ∈ N such that the invariant holds for
BIMax, which is possible since limk→∞(1 + α)−k = 0. Max keeps the energy above 1.
Max plays as follows. When Max’s budget is B, he bids α · B. Note that the strategy
is budget based since the bid depends only on the current budget.2 To conclude the proof,
we show that the invariant is maintained and that it guarantees that k > 1. We distinguish
between the two outcomes of a bidding. If Max loses, the energy decreases to k−1. Moreover,
Min overbids Max, thus Max’s new budget B′ is at least B + αB ≥ 1(1+α)k + α(1+α)k =
(1 + α)k−1. On the other hand, if Max wins, the energy increases to k + c and his new
budget B′ is at least B − αB = 1−α(1+α)k . By plugging in α and c in Lemma 10, we obtain
(1− α) = (1 + α)−c, thus B′ = (1 + α)−(k+c), as required. To conclude the proof, we have
k > 1, since otherwise, by the invariant, Max’s budget would be (1 + α)−1 > 1, which is
impossible since the budgets sum up to 1 in Richman bidding. J
3.2 Mean-payoff all-pay Richman games with probabilistic strategies
This section consists of our main technical contribution on all-pay Richman bidding. We
find optimal probabilistic strategies and show that they do not depend on the initial ratio,
thereby showing equivalence between mean-payoff all-pay and first-price Richman games.
I Lemma 12. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay Richman bidding game.
For every initial ratio r ∈ (0, 1) of Max, for every ε > 0, Max has a probabilistic budget-based
strategy in G that guarantees an expected payoff of at least MP(RT(G, 12+ε )).
Proof. Let c = 1 + ε, and let p = 12+ε =
1
1+c . We find vertex strengths using RT(G, p) as in
Section 2.3. Let α ∈ (0, 1) s.t. λ(α) = 1 + ε (see Lemma 10). We define Max’s strategy f as
follows.
When the token is on vertex v with strength s = Stp(v), and Max’s budget is B, Max
bids x ∼ Unif [0, αB sSmax ].
Upon winning, Max moves the token to v+.
We claim that no matter which deterministic strategy g Min chooses, we have lim infn→∞
Epin∈distn(f,g)[payoff(pin)] > MP(RT(G, p)). We assume Wlog that Min bids y ∈ [0, αB sSmax ],
since he has the tie-breaking advantage and does not profit from bidding higher.
Proofs in first-price bidding show an invariant between changes in energy and changes in
budget (see Prop. 11). For all-pay bidding, however, such an invariant is not possible. Our
invariant uses a new component, which we refer to as “luck”. Intuitively, a Max bid of x is
“unlucky” when x is much larger than y or when x is slightly smaller than y. In the first case,
Max pays a lot for winning and in the second, Min pays little for winning. The top-left to
bottom-right diagonal in Tab. 2 take these scenarios to the extreme. Dually, when x is just
above y or way below y, Max is “lucky”. See the other diagonal in the table. The key idea of
the proof is that on average, the unlucky and lucky cases cancel out.
2 For general SCCs, at a vertex v ∈ V , we bid α ·B · St1/(1+c)(v)/Smax, see more details in Lem. 12.
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To formalize the notion of luck, we define a quantity L as follows. Initially, we set
L0 = log1+αB. We define the change in luck following a bidding
∆L =
{
c( s2Smax +
y−x
αB ), if x > y,
(− s2Smax +
y−x
αB ), if x ≤ y.
(3.1)
We formalize the intuition that lucky and unlucky events cancel out with the following claim,
proved in App. D.
Claim: Suppose that following a finite play, Max bids x ∼ Unif [0, αB sSmax ], then for every
Min bid y ∈ [0, αB sSmax ], we have
Ex∼Unif [0,αB sSmax ][∆L] ≥ 0. (3.2)
For any finite play pi, recall that I+(pi) and G+(pi) are the sum of the strengths of the
vertices where Max wins, respectively loses. We prove in App. E that the budget B(pi) of
Max after the play pi satisfies the following invariant, by induction on the length of the play
and using Bernoulli’s inequality.
Claim: For every finite play pi coherent with the strategy f of Max, we have
B(pi) ≥ (1 + α)L− 12Smax (c·G+(pi)−I+(pi)). (3.3)
Since the sum of budgets is 1, we have B(pi) ≤ 1 = (1 + α)0. Comparing the exponents,
we obtain 1Smax
(
c · G+(pi) − I+(pi)) ≥ 2L. Since E[∆L] ≥ 0 at each turn and for each y,
we conclude that for any deterministic strategy g of Min we have E[L] ≥ L0 where the
expectation is taken over the probability space of all plays defined by f and g. Combining
with Lemma 6, by plugging ν = c and µ = 1, we finally obtain
E[energy(pi)] ≥ (c+ 1)Smax
c
L0 + P + (n− 1)MP(RT(G, p)). (3.4)
Dividing by n, we obtain lim infn→∞ payoff(pin) ≥ MP(RT(G, p)), and we are done. J
Since MP(RT(G, p)) is continuous in p [10, 26], it follows from Lemma 12 that eMP(G, r) ≥
MP(RT(G, 0.5)), for every r > 0. Note that since the definition of payoff favors Min, Min can
follow Max’s strategy above to show that Max cannot achieve a payoff of MP(RT(G, 0.5)) + ε.
We thus have the following.
I Theorem 13. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay Richman bidding game.
The expected mean-payoff value in G equals the surely mean-payoff value in G under first-price
bidding, which in turn equals the mean-payoff value of the random-turn game RT(G, 0.5)
in which the player who moves is chosen uniformly at random, thus for every budget ratio
r ∈ (0, 1), we have eMPAP-Rich(G, r) = sMPFP-Rich(G, r) = MP(RT(G, 0.5)).
3.3 Qualitative all-pay Richman games
In this section we consider strongly-connected parity AP-Rich games. Recall that under
FP-Rich, one of the players wins with any initial budget, and the winner depends on the
parity of the highest parity index. Analogously, we show that in parity AP-Rich games, one
of the players wins with probability 1 with any positive initial budget.
Let P be a parity game in which the maximal parity index is d ∈ N. We construct a
mean-payoff game G by setting the weight of a vertex v ∈ V to be 1 if the parity of v is d,
and otherwise w(v) = 0. The key property of this weight function is that any path η with
payoff(η) > 0 must visit a vertex with index d infinitely many times, and thus satisfies the
parity objective. The proof of the following lemma can be found in App. F.
G. Avni, I. Jecker, and Ð. Žikelić X:11
I Lemma 14. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff game with non-negative weights and
at least one strictly positive weight. Then, for every p ∈ (0, 1), we have MP(RT(G, p)) > 0.
The challenge in using an optimal strategy f for G in P is that the guarantees in G are
on the expected payoff, and they do not immediately imply almost-sure guarantees in P . We
manage to recover these guarantees by carefully and repeatedly invoking f to obtain the
following result.
I Theorem 15. Let G be a strongly-connected parity all-pay Richman bidding game in which
the highest parity is d ∈ N. Then, the player corresponding to the parity of d has a randomized
almost-sure winning strategy, no matter where the game starts and with which positive initial
ratio.
Proof. We assume WLog that the highest parity index d is odd and denote by S ⊆ V , the set
of vertices with parity index d. We construct G as in the above. Since G is strongly-connected,
for each r ∈ (0, 1) by Thm. 13, we have MP(G, r) = MP(RT(G, 12 )). Moreover, the proof
of Lemma 12 shows that there exists a strategy σ which guarantees a payoff of at least
MP(RT(G, 13 )) independent of the initial vertex and the initial budget. By Lemma 14, we
have MP(RT(G, 13 )) = 2δ for some δ > 0.
Next, we define a function τ : R≥0 → N that takes an initial ratio r, and returns an index
such that for every n ≥ τ(r), for every strategy of the opponent we have E[energy(pin)] > n · δ.
It follows from eq. (3.4), that E[energy(pin)] ≥ (n−1) ·MP(RT(G, 13 )) +Cr ≥ 2(n−1) · δ+Cr,
where Cr is a constant depending on r. We define τ(r) = d|Cr|/δe+ 3 hence, as required, for
every n ≥ τ(r) we have
Eσ[energy(pin)] ≥ 2(n− 1) · δ +Cr ≥ n · δ + (τ(r)− 2) · δ +Cr > n · δ + |Cr|+Cr ≥ n · δ.
The proof of the following claim can be found in App. G.
Claim: If Player 1 follows the strategy σ with an initial budget r, then the probability of
visiting a vertex in S during the first τ(r) steps is at least δ.
We are now ready to define the Player 1 strategy f that almost-surely guarantees the
parity objective. Let r ∈ (0, 1) be the initial budget of Player 1. We partition the budget
into portions r/2, r/4, r/8, . . . , and the time over which the game evolves into time periods
T1, T2, T3, . . . , where each Tk is of length τ(r/2k). Then for each k ∈ N, the strategy uses
portion r/2k of the initial budget to follow σ during the time period Tk.
We claim that f guarantees almost-surely visiting S infinitely often. We prove this by
contradiction and suppose that there exists a strategy g for the opponent such that S is
visited only finitely many times with positive probability (over the probability space defined
by f and g). This implies that
0 < P[∃k ∈ N s.t. S not visited after Tk] = P[∪k∈N{S not visited after Tk}]
≤
∞∑
k=0
P[{S not visited after Tk}],
where the last inequality follows by the union bound. Hence, there exists K ∈ N such that
P[{S not visited after TK}] > 0. This event is equivalent to S not being visited in time
periods TK+1, TK+2, . . . , which in turn implies that for every L ∈ N the probability of S
not being visited in between time TK and TK+L is also positive. But for a fixed L this
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probability can be factorized as
0 < P[{S not visited in TK+1, TK+2, . . . }] ≤ P[{S not visited in TK+1, TK+2, . . . TK+L}]
=
L−1∏
l=1
P[{S not visited in TK+l+1} | {S not visited in TK+1, . . . TK+l}]
· P[{S not visited in TK+1}].
(3.5)
A key point in the proof of the following claim is that the construction of f is budget-based.
As the budget used by the strategy f at the beginning of time period TK+l is r/2K+l, by
expanding each of the factors in eq. 3.5 as a sum over the initial vertex of the time period,
one can deduce the claim.
Claim: For each l ∈ N we have
P[{S not visited in TK+l+1} | {S not visited in TK+1, . . . TK+l}] ≤ 1− δ, and
P[{S not visited in TK+1}] ≤ 1− δ. J
4 All-Pay Poorman Bidding Games
In this section, we construct optimal deterministic strategies in all-pay poorman games. We
find it surprising that, contrary to all-pay Richman bidding games (Theorem 8), deterministic
strategies are useful in all-pay poorman bidding games. Throughout this section it is
technically convenient to keep Min’s budget normalized to 1, thus for a budget B of Max,
we consider the ratio B/(B + 1).
4.1 Revisiting mean-payoff first-price poorman games
The value of mean-payoff first-price poorman games was first identified in [5].
I Theorem 16 ([5]). Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay poorman bidding game.
For every initial ratio r = B0B0+1 ∈ (0, 1) of Max, we have sMPFP-poor(G, r) = MP(RT(G, r)).
We revisit this result and provide an alternative proof by constructing new and significantly
simpler optimal budget-based bidding strategies. We then base our solution to all-pay bidding
on the budget-based strategy.
I Lemma 17. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay poorman bidding game.
For every initial ratio r = B0B0+1 ∈ (0, 1) of Max, for every ε > 0, Max has a deterministic
budget-based strategy that guarantees a payoff of MP(RT(G, B0−εB0+1 )).
Proof. Let B0 ∈ R be Max’s initial budget. As usual, we keep Min’s budget normalized to 1.
Let ε > 0, and let W = B0 − ε. We design a deterministic strategy for Max that maintains
his budget B above W . Then, the value of the updated budget B′ of Max after a bidding
where Max bids b ∈ [0, 1) and Min bids a ∈ [0, 1) is as follows: If Max wins the bidding
(b > a), we have B′ = B− b. The key new insight is that when Max loses the bidding (a ≥ b),
we have
B′ = B1− a >
B(1− a2)
1− a = B(1 + a) > B +Wa. (4.1)
Intuitively, the property states that every cent is W times more valuable to Min than it is to
Max. For example, if Max’s budget is 2 and Min’s budget is 1, then paying 0.1 is twice as
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painful for Min as it is for Max. Roughly, on average, this means that Max wins W ∼ B0
times more biddings than Min, thus he guarantees a payoff close to MP(RT(G, B0B0+1 )).
We now proceed to define formally a budget-based bidding strategy f for Max that
guarantees a payoff of at least MP(RT(G, p)), where p = (B0−ε)/(B0 +1). We pick α ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying λ(α) = 1 + ε (see Lemma 10). We find vertex strengths using RT(G, p) as in
Section 2.3. Let N = max(W, 1) · Smax. The strategy f is defined as follows.
When the token is placed on a vertex v with strength s = Stp(v) and Max’s budget is B,
Max bids f(B, s) = α·sN (B −W ).
Upon winning, Max moves the token to v+.
We first show that Max’s bidding strategy f is legal, by showing that we always have B > W .
Indeed, initially, we have B0 > W , and then whenever Max loses a bidding his budget
increases, and when Max wins a bidding his updated budget is B−f(B, s) = B− α·sN (B−W ),
which is still greater than W since α·sN < 1.
Next, for any finite play pi, let H(pi) = (1 + ε) · I+(pi)− (B0 − ε) ·G+(pi)−N · log1+α(ε).
Recall that I+(pi) and G+(pi) denote the sum of the strengths of the vertices of pi where Max
wins, respectively loses. We prove in App. H that the budget B(pi) of Max after the play pi
satisfies the following invariant, using induction on the length of pi and Bernoulli’s inequality.
Claim: For every finite play pi coherent with the strategy f of Max, we have
(B(pi)−W )N ≥ (1 + α)−H(pi). (4.2)
As a consequence, we show the existence of a bound M such that H(pi) ≥M for every finite
play pi coherent with f .
Claim: There exists M ∈ R such that for every finite play pi coherent with f , we have
(1 + ε)I+(pi)− (B0 − ε)G+(pi) ≥M. (4.3)
The proof of the claim, found in App I, can be summarised as follows. Since the left-hand
side of the equation is equal to H(pi) + N · log1+α(ε), proving the claim is equivalent to
proving a lower bound for H(pi). To do so, we show that H(pi) cannot get too low, as past
some threshold Equation (4.2) guarantees that the budget B(pi) of Max is so high that his
next bid according to the strategy f will be above 1 (the whole budget of Min). Thus Max
is guaranteed to win the next bidding, which results in H(pi) going back up.
Combining Claim 4.3 with Corollary 7 (plugging ν = B0 − ε and µ = 1 + ε), we finally
obtain that any infinite play coherent with the strategy f has a mean-payoff greater than
MP(RT(G, (B0 − ε)/(B0 + 1))). J
4.2 Infinite-duration all-pay poorman-bidding games
This section consists of our main technical contribution for all-pay poorman bidding. We
first solve mean-payoff games, and then use our solution to solve parity games. Recall that,
the value of a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G w.r.t. an initial ratio r ∈ (0, 1) under
FP-poor is MP(RT(G, r)). The following theorem shows that the sure-value under all-pay
poorman bidding is not far from the sure-value under first-price poorman bidding.
I Theorem 18. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay poorman bidding game. For
every initial ratio r = B0B0+1 ∈ (0, 1) of Max, we have sMPAP-poor(G, r) = MP(RT(G, B0−1B0 )).
Since MP(RT(G, p)) is continuous in p [10, 26], we demonstrate the theorem by proving
the following lemma.
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I Lemma 19. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay poorman bidding game. For
every initial ratio r = B0B0+1 ∈ (0, 1) of Max, for every ε > 0,
1. Max can deterministically guarantee a payoff of MP(RT(G, B0−1−εB0 ));
2. For any fixed deterministic strategy of Max, Min can guarantee a payoff of MP(RT(G, B0−1+εB0 )).
Proof. In App. J, we show that the strategy that we constructed in Prop. 16 for FP-poor
guarantees a payoff of MP(RT(G, B0−1−εB0 )) under AP-poor. The analysis needs to be adjusted
to AP-poor. The main difference is that the change in Max’s budget following losing a
bidding to a bid a ∈ (0, 1) of Min is now
B′ = B − b1− a >
(B − b)(1− a2)
1− a = (B − b)(1 + a) > B − b+Wa.
For Item 2, consider a deterministic strategy f of Max. We describe a Min strategy
g as follows. Let W = B0 − 1 + ε, let N = B0Smax, and we choose α ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
λ(α) = 11−ε . For each vertex v ∈ V with strength s and a Max budget B, Min fixes a
threshold t(v,B) = sαN (W + 1 − B). When the token is placed on v, Min computes the
bid b that Max will bid according to f . If b ≤ t(v,B), Min bids b, wins the bidding and
moves to v−. If b > t(v,B), Min judges that the budget required to win the bidding is not
worth it, and stays out by bidding 0. In App. K, we show that g guarantees a payoff of
MP(RT(G, B0−1+εB0 )). Intuitively, technically, the threshold t(v,B) is where the invariant on
Max’s budget is (close to) an equality no matter the bid of Min. Thus, if Max bids higher
than t(v,B), he is paying “too much” for a win and eventually his budget will run out. J
In App. L, we show that a construction of a mean-payoff game from a parity game as in
Sec. 3.3 together with Lem. 19 provides the following.
I Corollary 20. Consider a strongly-connected parity game G in which the highest priority
is odd. For every initial ratio r > 0.5, Player 1 has a surely winning strategy in G.
5 Discussion
We study, for the first time, infinite-duration all-pay bidding games. We show a complete
picture for all-pay Richman bidding: deterministic strategies cannot guarantee anything,
and with probabilistic strategies, AP-Rich coincides with FP-Rich both for mean-payoff and
parity objectives. For all-pay poorman bidding, we show that, surprisingly, deterministic
strategies can guarantee a payoff not too far from the optimal payoff under FP-poor bidding.
We leave open the problem of classifying the expected value in a mean-payoff AP-poor
bidding game G. It is tempting to conjecture that as in AP-Rich bidding, the expected value
coincides with the sure-value under first-price bidding.However, this might not be true due
to the following difference between the bidding rules. When both players bid b > 0 (see
the bottom-right cell in Table 2), the situation under AP-Rich bidding is worse than under
AP-poor bidding. Indeed, with AP-Rich, Max’s updated budget is B′ = B − b + b = B,
whereas with AP-poor, his budget is B′ = (B− b)/(1− b), and we have B′ > B when r > 0.5.
This slight difference might lead to eMPAP-poor(G, r) > sMPFP-poor(G, r).
Taxman bidding spans the spectrum between Richman and poorman bidding: for a
constant τ ∈ [0, 1], portion τ is paid to the other player player and portion (1− τ) is paid
to the bank. Mean-payoff first-price taxman bidding games were studied in [6] with the
motivation to better understand the differences between FP-Rich and FP-poor bidding.
The same motivation applies to all-pay bidding, and we find it interesting to study all-pay
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taxman bidding. Unlike first-price bidding, with all-pay bidding classifying both the sure-
and expected-value for all-pay taxman bidding are interesting problems.
In terms of computational complexity, since solving stochastic games is in NP and coNP,
the equivalences between strongly-connected mean-payoff bidding games and random-turn
games implies the same upper bound on the problem of finding the sure or expected value of
the corresponding bidding game. Finding a lower bound, e.g., that bidding games are harder
than general stochastic games, is an open problem also for first-price bidding.
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A Proof of Corollary 7
Given an infinite play pi and n ∈ N, let us denote by pin the prefix of pi of length n. Suppose
that µ · I+(pin)− ν ·G+(pin) ≥M for every n ∈ N. Then applying Lemma 6 yields
payoff(pi) = lim inf
n→∞ payoff(pi
n) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
(
MP(RT(G, ν
µ+ ν )) +
P
n− 1 +
(µ+ ν)M
µν(n− 1)
)
.
This concludes the proof, as both fractions tend towards 0 as n approaches ∞.
B Bernoulli’s inequality
Bernoulli inequality is stated as follows.
1 + rx ≥ (1 + x)r for all r ∈ [0, 1] and x ≥ −1. (B.1)
C Properties of the shift function
The shift function is surjective as
(a) limx→0 λ(x) = 1 (l’Hôpital rule);
(b) limx→1 λ(x) = +∞;
(c) λ is continuous as its denominator is strictly positive over the domain, and log is
continuous.
As a consequence, for every y ∈ [1,∞), there exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that λ(x) = y. The second
item is a direct consequence of the definition of the shift function.
D Proof of Equation 3.2
Let β denote αB sSmax , let us fix a finite play pi and a bid y ∈ [0, αB sSmax ] of Min. We obtain:
Ex∼Unif [0,β][∆L] = 1β
∫ β
0 ∆L(x) dx
= 1β
( ∫ y
0 ∆L(x) dx+
∫ β
y
∆L(x) dx
)
= 1β
( ∫ y
0(− s2Smax +
y−x
αB ) dx+
∫ β
y
c( s2Smax +
y−x
αB ) dx
)
= 1β
(
y(− s2Smax +
y
αB )− y
2
2αB + c(β − y)( s2Smax +
y
αB )− cβ
2
2αB +
cy2
2αB
)
.
Since β = αB sSmax , we may substitute
s
Smax
= βαB above to get
Ex∼Unif [0,β][∆L] = 1β
(
y(− β2αB + yαB )− y
2
2αB + c(β − y)( β2αB + yαB )− cβ
2
2αB +
cy2
2αB
)
= 1β
(
y(y−β)
2αB +
cβy
2αB − cy
2
2αB
)
= 1β
(
y(y−β)
2αB +
cy(β−y)
2αB
)
= (c−1)y(β−y)2βαB ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows since c > 1 and y ∈ [0, β].
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E Proof of Claim 3.3
Consider a finite play pi in G coherent with the strategy f . To ease the notation, we write
H = c ·G+(pi)− I+(pi) and omit references to pi. We show that the following invariant holds:
B ≥ (1 + α)L− H2Smax .
We proceed by induction on the number of turns, where the base case follows from our
choice of L0. Suppose by induction that the equation holds for the values B and H obtained
after some prefix of pi, and that in the next round Min bids a and Max bids b. Let
B′ = B + a− b = B + ∆B and L′ = L+ ∆L. We want to show that B′ ≥ (1 + α)L′− H
′
2Smax ,
where H ′ = H − s if Min wins, and H ′ = H + cs if Max wins. By definition of ∆L, we get
∆B =
{
(∆L+ s2Smax )αB, if a ≥ b;
(∆Lc − s2Smax )αB, if a < b.
(E.1)
To conclude, we distinguish between the case in which Min wins and Max wins:
1. If Min wins the bidding, i.e., a ≥ b, then H ′ = H − s, and we we get:
B′
()= B + ∆B (E.1)= B + (∆L+ s2Smax )αB
()= B · (1 + (∆L+ s2SMax )α)
(B.1)
≥ B · (1 + α)∆L+ s2Smax
ind. hyp.
≥ (1 + α)L+∆L− H−s2Smax
()= (1 + α)L
′− H′2Smax .
Here, Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since α > −1 and ∆L+ s2Smax = a−bαB ∈ [0, 1].
2. If Max wins the bidding, i.e., a < b, then H ′ = H + cs, and we get:
B′ = B + ∆B (E.1)= B + (∆Lc − s2Smax )αB
()= B · (1− α(−∆Lc + s2Smax ))
(B.1)
≥ B · (1− α)−∆Lc + s2Smax
10≥ B · (1 + α)∆L− cs2Smax
ind. hyp.
≥ (1 + α)L+∆L− H+cs2Smax
()= (1 + α)L
′− H′2Smax
Here, Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since −α > −1 and −∆Lc + s2Smax = b−aαB ∈ [0, 1].
We also used Lemma 10: 1− α = (1 + α)−c since λ(α) = c.
F Proof of Lemma 14
Let v0 ∈ V be a vertex whose weight is positive. Since G is strongly-connected, every vertex
v ∈ V admits a shortest path to v0. Fix one such path for each v and let v′ be the successor
of v along this path (for v = v0, let v′ be any of its neighbors). Define the strategy σ for
Max via σ(v) = v′, so Max moves the token along the edge 〈v, v′〉 upon winning the coin
toss. We show that this strategy guarantees a positive mean-payoff with probability 1.
Let |V | = n. The length of a shortest path from any vertex in G to v0 is at most n− 1.
Thus if Max follows the strategy σ and wins n − 1 consecutive coin tosses, the token will
reach v0 at least once in those n− 1 turns. As the coin tosses are pairwise independent, the
probability of Max winning n − 1 times in a row is pn−1. We will use this observation to
show that σ ensures positive mean-payoff.
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For an infinite game play pi, let pim be its finite prefix of length m. Moreover, let vi(pi)
denote the i-th vertex along pi. If we write m = k · (n − 1) + r with 0 ≤ r < n − 1, the
expected energy of pim under σ and any fixed strategy of the opponent is
E[pim] ≥ Eσ[pik·(n−1)] ≥ w(v0) · E[#{1 ≤ j ≤ k · (n− 1) | vj(pi) = v0}]
= w(v0) ·
k−1∑
i=0
E[#{1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 | vi·(n−1)+j(pi) = v0}]
≥ w(v0) ·
k−1∑
i=0
E[I(vi·(n−1)+j(pi) = v0 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1)]
= w(v0) ·
k−1∑
i=0
P[vi·(n−1)+j(pi) = v0 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1]
≥ w(v0) ·
k−1∑
i=0
bn−1 = w(v0) · k · pn−1,
where the last inequality follows from the above observation. Since k = (m− r)/(n− 1) and
r < n− 1, we have k > m/(n− 1)− 1. Thus,
lim inf
m→∞
E[pim]
m
≥ w(v0) · lim inf
m→∞
(m/(n− 1)− 1) · pn−1
m
= w(v0) · p
n−1
n− 1 > 0,
and σ ensures positive mean-payoff as claimed.
G Proof of Theorem 15
Claim: If Player 1 follows the strategy σ with an initial budget r, then the probability of
visiting a vertex in S during the first τ(r) steps is at least δ.
To see why this holds, note that for every strategy of the opponent we know that
E[energy(piτ(r))] > τ(r) · δ. Expanding the left hand side,
τ(r) · δ < E[energy(piτ(r))]
= E[energy(piτ(r)) · I(S visited in τ(r) steps)] + E[energy(piτ(r)) · I(S not visited in τ(r) steps)]
= E[energy(piτ(r)) · I(S visited in τ(r) steps)] + 0 ≤ E[τ(r) · I(S visited in τ(r) steps)]
≤ τ(r) · P[S visited in τ(r) steps],
which proves the claim. Here, I(·) is the indicator function and the last inequality holds since
all weights in the graph are either 0 or 1 and thus energy(piτ(r)) ≤ τ(r) for any path pi. We
refer to this claim as the “important property” in the rest of this proof.
Claim: For each l ∈ N we have
P[{S not visited in TK+l+1} | {S not visited in TK+1, . . . TK+l}] ≤ 1− δ,
P[{S not visited in TK+1}] ≤ 1− δ.
Fix 1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1. We show that the corresponding conditional probability factor
in eq. (3.5) is bounded from above by 1 − δ. For each m ∈ N let vm(pi) denote the
vertex of path pi at the end of time period Tm. To make the notation more succinct, let
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A = {S not visited in TK+l+1} and B = {S not visited in TK+1, . . . TK+l}. By the law of
total probability,
P[A | B] = P[A ∩B]
P[B] =
∑
v∈V
P[A ∩B ∩ {vK+l(pi) = v}]
P[B]
=
∑
v∈V
P[A | B ∩ {vK+l(pi) = v}] · P[B ∩ {vK+l(pi) = v}]
P[B]
=
∑
v∈V
P[A | B ∩ {vK+l(pi) = v}] · P[{vK+l(pi) = v} | B]. (G.1)
Now, note that the strategy σ is budget-based. Since the strategy f is restarted after the
time period TK+l ends and follows strategy σ using the portion r/2K+l+1 of the initial
budget, this implies that the probability of S being visited in time period TK+l+1 depends
only on vK+l(pi) and not on the prior game history. Therefore, we conclude that P[A |
B ∩ {vK+l(pi) = v}] = P[A | {vK+l(pi) = v}] for each v ∈ V . By the previous Claim this
probability is at most 1− δ. Thus, plugging this back into equation (G.1) we conclude that
P[A | B] =
∑
v∈V
P[A | B ∩ {vK+l(pi) = v}] · P[{vK+l(pi) = v} | B]
≤
∑
v∈V
(1− δ) · P[{vK+l(pi) = v} | B]
= (1− δ) ·
∑
v∈V
P[{vK+l(pi) = v} | B]
= (1− δ) · P[vK+l(pi) ∈ V | B] = 1− δ.
This shows that each conditional probability factor in eq. (3.5) is at most (1− δ). Similarly
as above, by using the law of total probability to write
P[{S not visited in TK+1}] =
∑
v∈V
P[{S not visited in TK+1} | {vK(pi) = v}]·P[{vK(pi) = v}]
and applying the important property we conclude that P[{S not visited in TK+1}] < 1− δ.
This concludes the proof.
H Proof of Claim 4.2
Consider a finite play pi in G coherent with the strategy f . We show by induction on the
length of pi that the following invariant holds:
(B(pi)−W )N ≥ (1 + α)−H(pi).
At the start of the game, the equation holds by definition of H since B0 −W = ε. For
the induction step, suppose that the equation holds for the values B and H obtained after
prefix of pi, and that in the next round Min bids a and Max bids f(B, s). We show that the
equation still holds for the updated values B′ and H ′:
1. If a ≥ f(B, s), then H ′ ≥ H − (B0 − ε)s, and
(B′ −W )N (4.1)> (B −W +Wa)N ≥ (B −W +W · f(B, s))N
(= (B −W )N (1 + WsN α)N
ind. hyp.
≥ (1 + α)−H(1 + WsN α)N
(B.1)
≥ (1 + α)−H+Ws = (1 + α)−H+(B0−ε)s
(
≥ (1 + α)−H′ .
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Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since α > −1 and WsN = min( WsSmax , sSmax ) ∈ [0, 1].
We also used the fact that W = B0 − ε.
2. If a < f(B, s), then H ′ = H + (1 + ε)s, and
(B′ −W )N = (B −W − f(B, s))N
(= (B −W )N (1− sN α)N
ind. hyp.
≥ (1 + α)−H(1− sN α)N
(B.1)
≥ (1 + α)−H(1− α)s 10= (1 + α)−H−λ(α)s = (1 + α)−H−(1+ε)s
(
≥ (1 + α)−H′ .
Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since −α > −1 and sN = min( sSmax , sWSmax ) ∈ [0, 1].
We also used the fact that λ(α) = 1 + ε.
I Proof of Claim 4.3
We show the existence of a bound M ∈ R such that for every finite play pi in G coherent with
the strategy f , we have
(1 + ε)I+(pi)− (B0 − ε)G+(pi) ≥M.
Note that, by definition of H(pi), we can get the previously mentioned bound by showing a
lower bound for H(pi). Let Smin denote the minimal strength strictly greater than 0 that
appears in the game. We show by induction on the length of pi that the following holds:
H(pi) ≥ min(−N · log1+α(ε), N · log1+α(
Sminα
N
)− (B0 − ε)Smax). (I.1)
The equation holds at the start of the game since H is initially equal to −N · log1+α(ε). Now
suppose that the equation is satisfied for the value H obtained at some prefix of the play
pi, and let us prove that it still holds for the value H ′ at the next step. If Max wins the
corresponding round, we immediately get the result as H ′ > H. Similarly, if the strength of
the current vertex equals 0, we immediately get the result as H ′ = H. Now let us suppose
that Max loses the round, and that the strength s of the current vertex is strictly greater
than 0 (hence s ≥ Smin). Since Max loses, Min was able to outbid him, hence the bid f(B, s)
of Max was smaller than 1. By definition of f , this yields B −W ≤ Nsα ≤ NSminα . Therefore,
applying Equation 4.2 yields H ≥ N · log1+α( 1B−W ) ≥ N · log1+α(SminαN ). Combining this
with the fact that H ′ ≥ H − (B0− ε)s ≥ H − (B0− ε)Smax immediately proves Equation I.1.
J Lemma 19: proof of Item 1
I Lemma 21. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay Poorman bidding game.
For every initial ratio r = B0B0+1 ∈ (0, 1) of Max, for every ε > 0, Max can deterministically
guarantee a payoff of MP(RT(G, B0−1−εB0 )).
Proof. The proof is nearly identical to the one of Proposition 16. The main difference is
that we initially set the value of p to B0−1−εB0 instead of
B0−ε
B0
, and the value H(pi) is set
to (1 + ε) · G+(pi) − (B0 − 1 − ε) · I+(pi) − N · log1+α(ε), (whereas for Proposition 16 it
was (1 + ε) ·G+(pi)− (B0 − ε) · I+(pi)−N · log1+α(ε)). Then, using the same deterministic
strategy for Max, we show that the invariant (B(pi)−W )N ≥ (1 +α)−H(pi) holds once again,
which gives us the desired result through the use of Corollary 7.
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The strategy of Max To begin, we define a deterministic strategy f for Max: LetW = B0−ε
and let α ∈ (0, 1) satisfying λ(α) = 1 + ε (see Lemma 10). We find vertex strengths using
RT(G, p) as in Section 2.3. Let N = max(W, 1) · Smax. The strategy f is defined as follows.
If the token is on vertex v with strength s = Stp(v) and Max’s budget is B, he bids
f(B, s) = α·sN (B −W ).
Upon winning, Max moves the token to v+.
We first show that Max’s bidding strategy f is legal, by showing that we always have B > W .
Indeed, initially, we have B0 > W , and when Max bids f(B, s) against any bid a of Min, the
updated budget of Max is B − f(B, s) + a ≥ B − f(B, s) = B − α·sN (B −W ), which stays
greater than W since α·sN < 1.
The invariant We show an invariant between budget and energy, that in turn allows us to
prove the Lemma through the use of Corollary 7. For a finite play pi, let B(pi) denote the
budget of Max after pi, and let
H(pi) = (1 + ε) ·G+(pi)− (B0 − 1− ε) · I+(pi)−N · log1+α(ε).
Claim: For every finite play pi coherent with the strategy f of Max, we have
(B(pi)−W )N ≥ (1 + α)−H(pi). (J.1)
At the start of the game, the equation holds by definition of H since B0 −W = ε. For the
induction step, suppose that the equation holds for the values B and H corresponding to
some prefix of the play pi, and that in the next round Min bids a and Max bids f(B, s).
We show that the equation still holds for the updated values B′ and H ′. First, we can
approximate the updated budget of Max as follows:
B′ = B − f(B, s)1− a >
(B − f(B, s))(1− a2)
1− a = (B−f(B, s))(1+a) > B−f(B, s)+Wa. (J.2)
Then we distinguish between the case where Min wins and Max wins.
1. If a ≥ f(B, s), then H ′ ≥ H − (B0 − ε)s, and
(B′ −W )N
(J.2)
≥ (B −W − f(B, s) +Wa)N ≥ (B −W + (W − 1) · f(B, s))N
()= (B −W )N (1 + (W−1)sN α)N
ind. hyp.
≥ (1 + α)−H(1 + (W−1)sN α)N
(B.1)
≥ (1 + α)−H+(W−1)s = (1 + α)−H+(B0−1−ε)s
(
≥ (1 + α)−H′ .
Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since α > −1 and WsN = min( WsSmax , sSmax ) ∈ [0, 1].
We also used the fact that W = B0 − ε.
2. If f(B, s) > a, then H ′ = H + (1 + ε)s, and
(B′ −W )N ()= (B −W − f(B, s) + a)N ≥ (B −W − f(B, s))N
()= (B −W )N (1− sN α)N
ind. hyp.
≥ (1 + α)−H(1− sN α)N
(B.1)
≥ (1 + α)−H(1− α)s 10= (1 + α)−H−λ(α)s = (1 + α)−H−(1+ε)s
(
≥ (1 + α)−H′ .
Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since −α > −1 and sN = min( sSmax , sWSmax ) ∈ [0, 1].
We also used the fact that λ(α) = 1 + ε.
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Finally, since Min’s budget is normalized to 1, Max’s bids increase with his budget, and he
gains budget whenever he wins a bidding, we obtain an upper bound on B(pi). Together
with Corollary 7, we obtain the required result.
Lower bound over the energy Finally, we show that there exists a lower bound on the
value of (1 + ε)I+(pi)− (B0 − 1− ε)I+(pi), where pi ranges over the plays coherent with the
strategy f of Max. Then, Corollary 7 yields that the mean-payoff of any play coherent with
the strategy f is at least MP(RT(G, B0−1−εB0 )), which concludes the proof of Lemma 23.
Note that, by definition of H, we can get the previously mentioned lower bound by
showing a lower bound for H. Let Smin denote the minimal strength strictly greater than 0
that appears in the game. We prove that
H ≥ min(−N · log1+α(ε), N · log1+α(
Sminα
N
)− (B0 − 1− ε)Smax). (J.3)
This follows from the fact that if H gets two low, Equation J.1 implies that the budget of
Max is so high that his next bid will be above 1, ensuring him a win, and an increase of H.
Formally, Equation J.3 holds at the start of the game since H is initially equal to
−N · log1+α(ε). Now suppose that the equation holds for the value H corresponding to some
prefix of pi, and let us prove that it still holds for the value H ′ at the next step. If Max
wins the round, we immediately get the result as H ′ > H. Similarly, if the strength of the
current vertex equals 0, we immediately get the result as H ′ = H. Now let us suppose that
Max loses the round, and that the strength s of the current vertex is strictly greater than 0
(hence s ≥ Smin). Since Max loses, Min was able to outbid him, hence the bid f(B, s) of
Max was smaller than 1. By definition of f , this yields B −W ≤ Nsα ≤ NSminα . Therefore,
applying Equation J.1 yields H ≥ N · log1+α(SminαN ). Combining this with the fact that
H ′ ≥ H − (B0 − 1− ε)s ≥ H − (B0 − 1− ε)Smax immediately proves Equation J.3. J
K Lemma 19: proof of Item 2
Note that if we switch the signs of all of the weights in a game graph G, the roles of Max and
Min are swapped. Relying on this observation, we prove a result symmetric to Corollary 7,
that we then use to prove the second item of Lemma 19.
Consider a finite path η = v1, . . . , vn in a game graph G. We denote by I−(η) the
investments of Min (i.e., the sum of the strengths St(vi) of the vertices such that vi+1 = v−i ),
and we denote by G−(η) the gains of Min (i.e., the sum of the strengths St(vi) of the vertices
such that vi+1 6= v−i ). We can derive the following Corollary from Corollary 7.
I Corollary 22. Consider an infinite play pi of a game G, and let µ, ν ∈ R+ and M ∈ R. If
µ · I−(pi)− ν ·G−(pi) ≥M for every finite prefix pi of piω, then MP(piω) ≤ MP(RT(G, µµ+ν )).
Proof. Let p denote µµ+ν . Let pi be an infinite play of a game G, and assume that for every
finite prefix pi of piω we have µ·I−(pi)−ν ·G−(pi) ≥M . Consider the game graph Gˆ obtained by
multiplying all the weights of G by −1. First, note that MP(RT(G, p)) = −MP(RT(Gˆ, 1− p)).
Moreover, the optimal strategies of Max and Min are swapped between G and Gˆ: For every
vertex v of G, if we denote by vˆ the corresponding vertex of Gˆ, then the optimal successor v−
of v chosen by Min in RT(G, p) corresponds to the optimal successor vˆ+ of vˆ chosen by Max
in RT(Gˆ, 1− p). Therefore, the potential Potp(v) in RT(G, p) is equal to minus the potential
Potp(vˆ) in RT(Gˆ, 1− p), thus the strengths Stp(v) and St1−p(vˆ) are equal. As a consequence,
if we denote by pˆiω the play in Gˆ that corresponds to the same sequence of vertices as piω,
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then for every prefix pˆi of pˆiω, we have that I+(pˆi) = I−(pi) and G+(pˆi) = G−(pi). Thus our
initial assumption becomes µ · I+(pˆi)− ν ·G+(pˆi) ≥M for every finite prefix pˆi of pˆiω, and we
can apply Lem. 7 to get
MP(piω) = −MP(pˆiω) ≤ −MP(RT(Gˆ, ν
µ+ ν )) = −MP(RT(Gˆ, 1− p)) = MP(RT(G, p)).
This concludes the proof. J
We now prove that sMP(G, r) ≤ MP(RT(G, B0−1B0 )).
I Lemma 23. Let G be a strongly-connected mean-payoff all-pay poorman bidding game.
For every initial ratio r = B0B0+1 ∈ (0, 1) of Max, for every ε > 0, for any fixed deterministic
strategy of Max, Min can guarantee a payoff of MP(RT(G, B0−1+εB0 )).
Proof. Let ε > 0, and let us fix a deterministic strategy f of Max. To prove the lemma, we
construct a strategy g of Min such that the infinite play piω coherent with f and g satisfies
MP(piω) ≤ MP(RT(G, B0−1+εB0 )). The structure of the proof is similar to the one in our
previous proofs: We begin by defining a strategy g for Min. Then, we show that this strategy
guarantees an invariant relating the budget of Max with the gains and investments of Min.
Finally, we use this invariant to show an upper bound over (B0−1+ε) ·I−(pi)−(1−ε) ·G−(pi)
for every finite play pi coherent with the strategies f and g. This allows us to conclude
through the use of Corollary 22.
Min’s strategy We formally define Min’s strategy and the intuition can be found in the
body of the paper. The bidding function β− of Min is defined as follows. Let W = B0− 1 + ε
and let α ∈ (0, 1) satisfying λ(α) = 11−ε (see Lemma 10). We find vertex strengths using
RT(G, B0−1+εB0 ) as in Section 2.3. Let N = max(W, 1) · Smax.
If the token is on vertex v with strength s = Stp(v) and Max’s budget is B, Min computes
the bid b of Max according to the strategy f , and acts as follows:
1. If b ≤ sαN (W + 1−B), then Min bids b;
2. If b > sαN (W + 1−B), then Min bids 0.
Upon winning, Min moves the token to v−.
By definition of α and N , we have that sαN <
1
W for every strength s appearing in
the game. Therefore, whenever Min wins the round by matching the bid of Max, we can
approximate the updated budget B′ of Max as follows.
B′ = B − b1− b = B +
B − 1
1− b b ≤ B +
B − 1
1− 1W (W + 1−B)
b = B +Wb. (K.1)
As a first consequence of this approximation, we get that Min’s bidding strategy is legal:
since Wb ≤ WsN α(W +1−B) < W +1−B, we obtain that B′ < W +1 whenever B < W +1.
Since the initial budget B0 of Max is smaller than W + 1, this ensures that the budget of
Max will always be smaller than W + 1, which guarantees that Min will never have to bid
more than 1 (his budget) when he has to match the bid of Max according to the strategy g.
G. Avni, I. Jecker, and Ð. Žikelić X:25
The invariant We show an invariant between budget and energy. For a finite play pi, let
B(pi) denote the budget of Max after the play pi, and let
H(pi) = (B0 − 1− ε) · I−(pi)− (1− ε) ·G−(pi) +N · log1−α(ε).
Claim: For every finite play pi coherent with the strategies f and g, we have
(W + 1−B(pi))N ≥ (1− α)H(pi). (K.2)
At the start of the game, the equation holds by definition of H since W + 1−B0 = ε. For
the induction step, suppose that the equation holds for the values B and H obtained after
a prefix of pi, and that in the next round Min bids a and Max bids b. We show that the
equation still holds for the updated values B′ and H ′:
1. If b ≤ sαN (W + 1 − B), then Min matches the bid of Max and wins, hence a = b and
H ′ = H + (B0 − 1 + ε)s. Then
(W + 1−B′)N
(K.1)
≥ (W + 1−B −Wb)N ≥ (W + 1−B −W sαN (W + 1−B))N
(= (W + 1−B)N (1− WsN α)N
ind. hyp.
≥ (1− α)H(1− WsN α)N
(B.1)
≥ (1− α)H+Ws = (1− α)H+(B0−1+ε)s
(= (1− α)H′ .
Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since α > −1 and WsN = min( WsSmax , sSmax ) ∈ [0, 1].
We also used the fact that W = B0 − 1 + ε.
2. If b > sαN (W + 1− B), then Min bids 0 and loses, hence a = 0 and H ′ ≥ H − (1− ε)s.
Then
(W + 1−B′)N (= (W + 1−B + b)N > (W + 1−B + sαN (W + 1−B))N
(= (W + 1−B)N (1 + sN α)N
ind. hyp.
≥ (1− α)H(1 + sN α)N
(B.1)
≥ (1− α)H(1 + α)s 10= (1− α)H−s/λ(α) = (1− α)H−(1−ε)s
(
≥ (1− α)H′ .
Bernoulli’s inequality could be used since −α > −1 and sN = min( sSmax , sWSmax ) ∈ [0, 1].
We also used the fact that λ(α) = 11−ε .
Lower bound over the energy For every finite play pi coherent with the strategies f
and g, as the budget of Max never goes below zero (B(pi) ≥ 0), Equation K.2 implies
H(pi) ≥ N · log1−α(W + 1) = N · log1−α(B0 + ε). Then, by applying the definition of H we
get
(B0 − 1 + ε)I−(pi)− (1− ε)I−(pi) = H −N · log1−α(ε) ≥ N · log1−α
(B0 + ε
ε
)
.
Therefore, by applying Corollary 22, we obtain that the mean-payoff of the infinite play
coherent with the strategies f and g is at most MP(RT(G, B0−1+εB0 )). This concludes the
proof of Lemma 23. J
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L Proof of Corollary 20
Given a strongly-connected parity game G in which the highest priority d is odd, we obtain a
mean-payoff game as in Section 3.3: we set the weight of a vertex v ∈ V to 1 if its priority is
d, and otherwise w(v) = 0. By Lem. 14, we have MP(RT(G, p)) > 0, for every p ∈ (0, 1). A
deterministic strategy in G that guarantees a positive mean-payoff is a winning strategy for
Player 1 in P since it guarantees visiting positive-valued vertices in G infinitely often, which
are the maximal-indexed vertices in P. Lem. 19 shows that such a deterministic strategy
exists when Player 1’s ratio is r > 0.5, thus the corollary follows.
